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The repudiated compromise arises when one party to a contract threatens
to or does actually breach some term of a contract and, rather than take the
problem to court, the parties agree to a compromise. Perhaps a buyer agrees
to a new, higher price or to tolerate a seller's delay in performance. After the
would-be breacher has performed, however, the other party repudiates the
compromise by refusing to perform its revised obligation (e.g., refusing to pay
the higher price) or by suing for damages under the original contract (e.g., suing
for the delay). In such a case the court must decide whether to uphold the
original contract, which would have been breached by one party, or to uphold
the subsequent compromise, which is now repudiated by the other. The parties
come to court having made two agreements for different results, one agreement
seeming to have priority because it was first, the other so seeming because it
is the most recent. Two historic and widely cited cases follow:
Case 1: Ship with a crew of ten sailors embarks on an expedition,
wages for each sailor having been fixed in advance. Enroute, two sailors
desert. The captain offers to disburse wages of these two among the
remaining eight if they will continue despite reduced crew size. Crew
agrees. On completion of the expedition, crew is paid only the original,
not higher, wage. One sailor sues. Held, judgment for the captain and
employer on grounds that the sailors had apre-existing duty to complete
the voyage and that new consideration for the second agreement was
absent.'
Case 2: Ship's crew is hired in San Francisco for a fishing expedition,
the wages of each crew member fixed in advance. Once off the coast
of Alaska, the crew refuses to continue unless the employer doubles
their wages. The employer agrees. On completion of the expedition,
crew is paid only the original, not higher, wage. Crew sues. Held,
judgment for the employer on grounds of pre-existing duty in the crew
and absence of new consideration for the second agreement. 2
Nearly a hundred years apart, the courts reached identical holdings under
identical doctrine, appearing to disregard important differences between the two
1. Stilk v. Myrick, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (K.B. 1809).
2. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
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cases. The crew in Case 1 shoulders a burden (sailing with fewer crew) for
which they did not originally contract, ultimately performing more work for
the same pay; the crew in Case 2 "holds up" its employer, when the employer
has no other options, in order to extract more pay for the same work that was
originally contracted.3 Conventional doctrine, though, provides no means of
distinguishing these quite distinct cases. Rather, courts have inconsistently
upheld both contracts and compromises when repudiation of a compromise
follows upon breach of the original agreement.4
Solutions to the problem of repudiated compromise have been meager. One
solution is the state of mind theory,5 in which the parties' respective states of
mind at the time of the compromise are dispositive: if voluntary, then the
compromise is upheld; if not the contract is upheld. Endorsed by some courts, 6
the state of mind theory nevertheless runs afoul of certain problems,7 and other
courts have explicitly disavowed it.'
This Note proposes a rule of decision forresolving cases of repudiated com-
promise. The rule diverges from traditional doctrine, especially the doctrine of
pre-existing duty and consideration, and also avoids disposition based on states
of mind. In brief the rule is that, where a compromise follows a breach that is
caused by changed conditions, the compromise is upheld if it is consistent with
the risk allocation implied by or explicit in the original contract; if the compro-
mise is not consistent with that allocation, then the contract is upheld. Alterna-
tively, where a compromise follows a breach not caused by changed conditions,
the contract is always upheld.
This rule preserves the ends for which contracts are designed. 9 These ends
are, first, that wealth- or value-enhancing exchanges should occur, and second
that, under a contract, such exchanges are facilitated because the parties need
not perform their obligations simultaneously. That is, contracts allow a party
to rely upon its partner's future performance. As discussed infra, these ends
are achieved only when a stable risk allocation is maintained across both the
contract and subsequent compromise. Thus, the proposed rule ensures a stable
risk allocation when some unanticipated risk or change of conditions arises.
3. Under the theory proposed herein, these two cases would be decided differently. See infra discussion
at Section IIL
4. See infra Part I for discussion of courts' inconsistency.
5. See Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of
Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849 (1979).
6. Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, 625 F. Supp. 998, 1016 (D. Del. 1985); Alexander v. Standard Oil
Co., 97 IlL App. 3d 809, 814, 423 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
7. One problem is that it requires the court to determine what, in fact, were the parties' states of mind
at the time of the compromise, and this is likely to be difficult. Another is that, to the degree that judicial
outcomes create incentives for future behavior, a state of mind holding warns parties that, if they want to
win later in court, they should at least appear to be under duress, even if they are not. Such holdings might
provide incentives for the mere appearance of the judicially approved state of mind and thereby distort
genuine negotiation.
8. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, 3.).
9. See infra Part HT for discussion of rationale.
2230 [Vol. 100: 2229
1991] Repudiated Compromise 2231
Part I of this Note demonstrates the need for the rule by showing that courts
have been inconsistent in treating repudiated compromises, in both older and
recent cases. 10 Part II describes and provides a rationale for the rule, and Part
III applies it to sample cases.
I. CASES AND EXTANT DOCTRINE
Historically courts have been inconsistent in their disposition of breached
compromises, employing certain doctrines to uphold original contracts and
alternative ones to uphold compromises. For example, the courts have employed
the doctrines of pre-existing duty, absence of new consideration," economic
duress, 2 and unequal bargaining power13 to uphold original contracts and set
aside compromises. Just as often the courts have applied the doctrines of
frustration (or impossibility) 4 and of fairness to reach the opposite holding,
preserving the compromise and voiding the contract. In two illustrative cases, 5
the contract or compromise was upheld under a particular doctrine at trial, then
set aside under an entirely different doctrine on appeal. In short, courts have
been unable to resolve the dilemma of parties who make conflicting claims not
about the same agreement (as in the single contract case) but about two differ-
ent agreements that ostensibly govern the same transaction. Examples of
historic and recent cases follow.
10. The problem of repudiated compromises is very old, and the structure of the underlying fact patterns
leading to the problem has remained remarkably constant. The classic duress pattern, for example, has
spanned more than a century of American litigation: victim of breach, under duress, signs waiver releasing
his adversary from liability for a wrongful act. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d
560 (Ala. 1985); Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N.W. 511 (1881); Goldbard v. Empire State Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 5 A.D.2d 230, 171 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).
1I. The doctrine of consideration has itself given rise to inconsistency. Compare Spencer v. McLean,
20 Ind. App. 626, 50 N.E. 769 (1898) (promise made to induce another to do act he is already legally bound
to do is without consideration) with Wescott v. Mitchel, 95 Me. 377, 50 A. 21 (1901) (mere agreement to
perform existing contract obligation is valid consideration for new promise by other party).
12. See Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (A. Kronman
& R. Posner eds. 1979) 67-72; Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV.
253 (1947); Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); Hillman,
Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64
IOWA L. REV. 849 (1979); Mather, Contract Modification Under Duress, 33 S.C.L. REV. 615 (1982); Muris,
Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981); Narasimhan, Modification:
The Self-Help SpecficPerformance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61(1987); Robison, Enforcing Extorted Contract
Modifications, 68 IOWA L. REV. 699 (1983). See generally Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReapprais-
al, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 93 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979); Schwartz, A Re-
examination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053 (1979).
13. See Trebilcock, The Doctrine of lnequality ofBargaining Power, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 78 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979).
14. See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility andRelated Doctrines in Contract Law, in THE ECONOMIcs
OF CONTRACT LAW 122 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds 1979).
15. Recker v. Gustafson, 279 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1979); Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I. 482, 322 A.2d 630
(1974).
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A. Compromises Upheld
In the classic case of Goebel v. Linn, 6 the original contract called for an
ice company to supply a brewer with ice at $1.75 per ton or $2.00 per ton if
the ice crop was short. Because of an especially mild winter and short crop,
the ice company threatened breach but offered a compromise at a higher price.
The brewer, whose beer would otherwise spoil, agreed to the ice company's
demand for $3.50 per ton. Later, the brewer refused to complete payments, and
the ice company sued. The court held the brewer to the compromise at the
higher price. It reasoned that the ice which was consideration for payment under
the original contract was equally consideration for the compromise because it
was owned by the ice company and subsequently bought by the brewer. The
ice company's demand for a higher price was motivated by unexpected condi-
tions (the mild winter) and not by a desire to take advantage of the brewer's
need for ice. Thus, the brewer did not succumb to duress or extortion. Rather,
the brewer might have stood upon its contractual rights and sued under the
original contract at the time of the breach; that it chose not to do so, for reasons
it must have deemed sufficient, shows that it entered voluntarily into the
compromise.17
The Goebel court explicitly relied on the doctrine of impossibility or
frustration (i.e., the ice company's performance of the original contract was
frustrated by the mild winter), and the court minimized the issues of new
consideration for the compromise and the brewer's economic duress. The court
implicitly relied on the assumption of equal bargaining power between parties,
for it noted that both parties had full knowledge of the facts and that the
compromise prevented both businesses from coming to ruin on account of a
mild winter.
The Goebel court relied for authority on Moore v. Detroit Locomotive
Works,"8 which employed the same doctrines. In Moore, the manufacturer of
a locomotive engine was long delayed in delivery, causing business losses to
the buyer. When the manufacturer was finally ready to deliver, it refused to do
so without first receiving from the buyer a waiver which released the manufac-
turer from all liability for the delay. In favoring the manufacturer and upholding
this compromise, the court held that the manufacturer's promise not to breach
the original contract (through nondelivery) was sufficient consideration for the
waiver demanded in the compromise.
A modem case that parallels Goebel and Moore is Angel v. Murray.19 Here
a refuse hauler and a municipality, after reaching a contract for refuse collec-
tion, later agreed to a compromise that required the city to pay the refuse hauler
16. 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284 (1882).
17. Id. at 493, 11 N.W. at 285.
18. 14 Mich. 266 (sic) (1866).
19. 113 ILI. 482, 322 A.2d 630 (1974).
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an additional $10,000 per year for two years. Changed conditions allegedly
justified these higher payments. Housing in the city had increased by 400 units,
whereas the original contract had been predicated on an average annual increase
of only twenty to twenty-five units. The trial judge had ordered the refuse
hauler to repay the city the $20,000 specified in the compromise, upholding the
original contract under the doctrines of pre-existing duty and the absence of
new consideration. 2 The refuse hauler, the trial court had said, was already
obligated to dispose of the city's refuse, and so the second agreement (compro-
mise) which was without new benefit to the city, was void. On appeal the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed, setting aside the original contract and
upholding the compromise under the fairness doctrine.2' Although acknowl-
edging the pre-existing duty rule (and the confusion in this area of the law) the
supreme court reasoned that a fair and equitable compromise, arrived at volun-
tarily, should be upheld even when new consideration is not involved. Employ-
ment of the fairness doctrine here rested on the doctrine of frustration by
changed conditions: housing had increased.'
The above cases show that the doctrines of fairness, consideration, and
impossibility or frustration by changed conditions have been employed to
uphold compromises. In every case, the court set aside the original contract and
granted judgment in favor of the breacher or would-be breacher of the original
contract.
B. Compromises Set Aside
Alaska Packers' Association v. Domenico23 is one of the most cited cases
in which a compromise was set aside. As described above as Case 2, a crew
of sailor-fishermen agreed to complete a fishing expedition, but once off the
coast of Alaska they refused to continue unless their employer doubled their
pay. Lacking an alternative source of labor, the employer agreed. On comple-
tion of the trip, however, the employer paid the original, lower wage. In
favoring the employer and setting aside the compromise, the circuit court
reasoned that the doctrine of pre-existing duty, coupled with the absence of new
consideration and the coercion or duress endured by the employer, dictated that
the original contract should be upheld.'
The identical doctrine had been used earlier in two cases that are superfi-
cially similar to Alaska Packers. In Reynolds v. Nugent, 5 a town offered to
20. See id. at 632.
21. ld. at 636.
22. Note that parties to the contract here were not in disagreement about the fairness of the compromise;
both supported it. The suit was initiated by citizens of the city who objected to the city's increased payments
to the refuse hauler.
23. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
24. Id. at 102.
25. 25 Ind. 328 (1865).
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pay a soldier $100 for fighting on its behalf in the American Civil War. The
mercenary accepted the offer, but just before being mustered in, he received
an offer of $350 to fight for another town. Thereupon the town with which he
had originally contracted offered to match this offer and so increased its pay
to $350. Under this compromise, the soldier performed. After the war, the town
paid him only $100. The court ruled against the soldier and upheld the original
contract under the doctrines of pre-existing duty and absence of consideration
for the compromise.2
The case of Stilk v. Myrick,27described as Case 1 above, is similar. Here
a crew lost two members enroute, and their employer agreed to pay the remain-
ing crew additional wages. At the completion of the trip, however, he paid only
the original, lower wage, which was upheld by the court under the pre-existing
duty doctrine. The sailors were already required, reasoned the court, to complete
the expedition.s
It is arguable whether in Stilk (higher wage for crew reduced in size) or in
Reynolds (higher wage for mercenary offered more by another town) the
respective employers were also under economic duress. Certainly in Alaska
Packers (higher wage for crew refusing to continue) it was not only the pre-
existing duty in the crew but also the economic duress of the employer which
led the court to set aside the compromise.
A modern case of compromise set aside on grounds of economic duress is
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp.29 Here a seller threatened breach by
ceasing deliveries unless the buyer agreed to pay higher prices for goods
already received and forthcoming. Because the buyer desperately needed the
goods (having dependent contractual obligations to a third party) and could not
obtain them elsewhere, the court held that he had agreed to the higher, compro-
mise prices only under economic duress. Thus the compromise was set aside.30
Similarly, in Roth Steel Products. v. Sharon Steel Corp.,3t buyers who
were under contract had to accept price increases and delivery delays when the
sellers threatened breach and the buyers were unable to obtain the material
26. Id. at 329-30.
27. 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (K.B. 1809).
28. Id. at 1169.
29. 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971).
30. Part of the court's dilemma, of course, is determining whether the would-be victim of duress or
breach should be excused for not having stood upon his legal rights earlier, bringing suit at the time of
breach instead of yielding to a compromise and then repudiating it. In fact, in the early Radich case the
Supreme Court held that plaintiff should have gone so far as to avoid transacting business with one who
would put him under duress. When Radich tried to export his cotton, an officer of the Confederacy refused
to issue the required permit except on exorbitant payment of cash or a giving over of half the goods. Radich
paid exorbitantly, then sued. Held, judgment for defendant: plaintiff could have kept his cotton. Radich v.
Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210 (1877). There are modern cases decided on the same reasoning. See Selmer Co. v.
Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (victim of breach need not have compromised);
Joyce v. Year Investments, Inc., 45 Ill. App. 2d 310, 196 N.E.2d 24 (1964) (duress does not exist when
victim had choice to take legal action but instead entered into compromise).
31. 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983).
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elsewhere. Finding that the sellers engaged in coercion (threatening not to sell
further to the buyer), the court set aside the compromise with higher prices. The
case was complicated, however, by the fact that the sellers demanded price
increases at a time when market conditions had greatly escalated the price of
steel (the good in question), and the supply could not be increased because the
industry was operating at full production capacity. In dicta, the court indicated
that such changes in market conditions would legitimately prompt a seller to
seek a higher price, but seeking such with coercive conduct invalidated the
resulting compromise.32
Recker v. Gustafson33 is a modem case of compromise set aside on the
ground that there was no new consideration for it. Here the parties had a
contract for the sale of land. The sellers sought a price increase of $10,000 and
to which the buyers agreed. The court held that where there is no rescission
of the original contract, but only a modification of its terms, new consideration
is necessary. Because there was no consideration for the second agreement, it
was not binding.' 4
The above examples of compromises set aside show that the doctrines of
duress, economic duress, pre-existing duty, and consideration may be used to
uphold original contracts and thereby favor the party who was the victim of
the original breach.
C. Conclusion
As we have seen, a court may employ any of a number of conflicting
doctrines to reach its desired result in situations of repudiated compromise after
breach. Using the doctrine of economic duress, for example, courts have set
aside some compromises but not others. The courts in Alaska Packers, Austin
Instrument, and Roth Steel found that evidence of economic duress will void
a compromise,35 but the courts in Goebe36 and Moore37 upheld compromis-
es even when the buyer agreed to them under conditions of economic duress.
Courts have also applied the doctrine of frustration inconsistently. The
courts in Goebel and Angel allowed the changed conditions under which one
party would perform (respectively, harvesting ice in a mild winter and collect-
ing refuse at more homes) to set aside an original contract and replace it with
32. Id. at 147-48.
33. 279 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1979).
34. Compare Recker with Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669
(1963) (compromise set aside where sellers lowered buyer's installment payments, but later repudiated and
sought replevin). In Skinner, the court held that modification of the terms of a contract needs no new
consideration to be binding. Although the cases appear to conflict, a major difference between them is that,
Skinner's sellers, unlike Recker's, voluntarily lowered rather than raised buyer's payments.
35. In Alaska Packers the employer had no other crew available to complete the fishing expedition;
in Austin Instrument and Roth Steel the goods were needed for manufacturing other products under contract.
36. In Goebel the buyer needed ice to produce beer.
37. In Moore the buyer needed the locomotive engine to run a train line.
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a compromise. But prior to both these cases, the English common law, exempli-
fied in Stilk,38 had not approved the frustration of a pre-existing duty by
changed conditions giving rise to compromise. Not only changed conditions
generally, but also changes in market conditions, have been viewed inconsis-
tently by courts. In the case of Reynolds, the fact that the mercenary could
better profit by fighting for another town was not seen to justify a breach and
compromise, but the dicta of Roth Steel indicates the opposite: if a higher-
paying buyer can be found, the seller would seemingly be justified in seeking
the better profit.
The doctrine of consideration has also been applied inconsistently in
upholding and setting aside repudiated compromises. The courts in Goebel,
Moore, and Angel did not require new consideration for their respective com-
promises and so upheld them. On the contrary, several courts-Alaska Packers,
Reynolds, Stilk, and Recker---held that without consideration the compromise
was void, and the parties kept to their original obligations.
Under inconsistent doctrines, then, courts have both upheld and set aside
repudiated compromises.' The following section proposes a decision rule for
adjudicating repudiated compromises and describes the underlying rationale,
drawn generally from economic theory, that justifies it.
II. PROPOSED DECISION RULE
The proposed decision rule applies to repudiated compromises that follow
an actual or threatened breach, where the breach in question results from a
change in the conditions under which performance will be rendered. There are
two types of such changes, and the rule applies to both situations: (1) changes
that render performance more difficult or costly than was anticipated at the time
of contract (e.g., new materials must be used; the route of travel is longer) and
(2) market changes that render performance with one's contractual partner less
profitable than performance for another (e.g., new buyers are available and
willing to pay more).
38. In Stilk the crew of sailors had lost two members.
39. In the Recker compromise, the buyers had agreed to a higher price for the sale of land.
40. It is important to distinguish the cases of repudiated compromise discussed supra from other cases
in which the same doctrines are employed-e.g., duress, frustration, consideration, etc.-but no compromise
or second agreement is in dispute. Rather, only one, initial contract is at issue. It is quite possible that these
doctrines satisfactorily resolve initial contracts but not repudiated compromises. That is, the repudiated
compromise, because it is a more complicated contractual relation, may be unfit for resolution under
doctrines designed to resolve more straightforward, initial contracts. For example, with the cases discussed
supra, compare the following. On duress: Kaplan v. Kaplan, 25 Ill. 2d 181; 182 N.E.2d 706 (1962); Gates
v. Shutts, 7 Mich. 126 (1859). On frustration: American Trading and Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd.,
453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972); Superintendent and Trustees of Public Schools v. Bennett, 27 N.IL 513 (
NJ. 1859). On release and waiver Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946); Goldbard
v. Empire State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 A.D.2d 230, 171 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).
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A. A New Rule
The proposed rule: The compromise is upheld if it is consistent with the risk
allocation implied by or explicit in the original contract; if the compromise is
not consistent with that allocation, then the compromise is set aside and the
contract is upheld. For example, resolving the Stilk case (crew reduced in size
is promised higher wage) turns critically on whether the risk of reduced crew
size that resulted from desertion is allocated to the captain or to the crew, and
whether the compromise (crew to be paid additional wages) is consistent with
that allocation. If the compromise is consistent with the original allocation it
is upheld, if not it is set aside. (We shall see later that the compromise was
indeed consistent with the original allocation and should have been upheld.)
Two corollaries accompany this rule. The first is as follows: A change in
conditions which makes one party's performance more difficult, more costly,
or less profitable is, by itself, insufficient justification for setting aside an
original contract. Note that under this corollary, parties are held to their
contractual obligation even in the face of unexpected changes in circumstance
or changes in the market. Thus, there is no justification for upholding a com-
promise that merely compensates a party who has encountered difficulties or
that alleviates the obligation when a party has found a preferable contractual
partner.
The second corollary is that all risks of changed conditions-whether they
affect performance, the market, or both-are allocated, implicitly or explicitly,
to the parties. If the allocation is not implicit or explicit in the original contract,
then the risk is allocated to the party who can most easily and cheaply control
or predict the change in conditions or who can recoup losses arising from it
through its future conduct.41 Put succinctly, it is the cheapest cost avoider who
shoulders a particular risk. It follows from this that the burden of a risk must
remain with the party who assumed it or to whom it was allocated, and may
not be shifted to the other party (unless the other party agrees and is compen-
sated). When this occurs-the burden shifts to the opposite party, who is
compensated-it amounts to a rescission of the original contract and its replace-
ment with another. Further, it follows that one party may not cause changed
conditions, or other risks, to descend upon the other party. In so doing, one
party could increase the other's burdens and costs of performance. (An example
of this occurs in Angel v. Murray.42)
In summary, the decision rule assumes that a contract cannot be compro-
mised simply because one party encountered the very conditions for which it
assumed, or was allocated, the risk. Thus, where there are changed conditions,
41. This suggests that parties to a contract should, in fact, explicitly allocate as many risks as they can
reasonably foresee at the time of the original contract.
42. 113 R.I. 482, 322 A.2d 630 (1974).
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a compromise that is made to preserve a party's risk burden is to be upheld.43
B. Justification for the Rule
The aim of the rule is to enforce a stable allocation of risks once a contract
has been made." The contract explicitly, or more often implicitly, allocates
to each party the risk that one or more disadvantageous events may occur.
Perhaps the principal risk that each party bears is the possibility that it may
have made a bad deal: it may have underestimated its costs, wrongly predicted
the weather, or erroneously concluded that it could not have made a better deal
elsewhere if it had searched or waited longer. I do not undertake here to explain
how such risks should be allocated (except to note that the more control a party
has over a particular condition, the more likely it is to be allocated the risk that
unfavorable changes in that condition will occur). Rather, my purpose is to
show that only stable allocations of risk-more simply, stable contracts-are
capable of achieving the ends for which contracts are designed. Only stable
contracts facilitate advantageous exchanges of wealth; thus the compromise
subsequent to a contract's formation must seek to preserve the original, con-
tracted-for risk allocation, meanwhile adapting it to the changed conditions.
Unstable or flexible contracts promote uncertainty and cannot achieve the ends
for which contracts are designed. To see why this is so it is necessary to
consider briefly why exchanges of wealth are desirable and why they are
facilitated by stable contracts.
Exchanges of wealth are desirable because they facilitate the efficient
allocation of resources. That is, when people buy, sell, and trade, goods or
resources that are of less value to one party move to a party that places a higher
value on them. Such exchanges are termed value-enhancing because, for
example, when party A gives up X, which he does not want, in order to obtain
Y, which he does want, and if party B in the exchange does the same thing,
then the total value to the two parties has increased: each party has more value
than he had before because he released the less desirable for the more desir-
able.4 Especially in cases where the seller sells for somewhat more than he
43. Note, however, that although the contract may not be set aside for changed conditions, breach is
still possible under the first principle with payment of expectation damages to the breached-against party.
That is, the breaching party need not specifically perform, but it must pay damages that will put its
contractual partner in as good a position as it would have attained had performance been rendered. I do
not consider further here the issues attending expectation damages: how they should be calculated, whether
in fact they fully compensate, and what to do in cases involving unique goods. Rather, I assume for the
present purposes that expectation damages can be conceived of in such a way that their payment fully
satisfies the contractual obligation. The central point is that the rule will not allow changed conditions to
justify setting aside a contract and upholding a compromise, but it will support breach with expectation
damages as a method of upholding the contract.
44. A discussion of efficient risk allocation may be found in R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND
EcoNoMics 326-476 (1988) (Although their discussion is aimed at risks in tort, much of it is generally
applicable to the allocation of risks under a contract).
45. A detailed elaboration appears in R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-17 (3d ed. 1986).
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would have taken, and the buyer buys for somewhat less than he would have
paid, total value has increased because each party has gained somewhat more
than he would have required to make the exchange.
Contracts facilitate these value-enhancing exchanges of wealth because
contracts allow exchanges in which both parties need not perform simultaneous-
ly. Briefly put, contracts make otherwise inconvenient exchanges of wealth
convenient. Each party may conduct itself as though the other will perform
because it relies upon the contract to ensure that the other will indeed perform
in the future" or will pay damages in lieu of performance. Admittedly the
latter option-payment of damages-is only successful in facilitating exchange
if, in case of breach, the breached-against party is put in as good a position
after breach as he would have been in after the other party's performance. That
is, the breached-against party must receive expectation damages. Expectation
damages are often difficult to obtain (courts are reluctant to award them,
breachers reluctant to pay them), and even if obtainable are difficult to calcu-
late. Whether expectation damages that are actually received do, in fact, put
the breached-against party in as good a position as performance would have
put him in is arguable and will not be discussed further here. At least theoreti-
cally, expectation damages put the breached-against party in as good a position,
and thus contracts-even breached contracts-may act to facilitate exchanges
of wealth in which the transfers made by the parties need not be simultaneous.
But only stable contracts (more properly stable risk allocations) may
accomplish this. Unstable contracts-those defeated by unexpected changes in
conditions-are of little value in providing the assurance of future performance
or payment of damages. Hence unstable contracts are of little value in facilitat-
ing exchange. The decision rule proposed here, therefore, calls for a presump-
tively stable risk allocation in the face of changed conditions.
We may ask whether the rule is usefully different from the state of mind
theory, for at least on the surface the two seem to espouse a common aim: to
preserve what the parties were thinking about or had in mind when they came
to the compromise. That is, the state of mind theory upholds compromises
where the parties compromised voluntarily, 7 and the proposed rule upholds
the risks and costs that the parties allocated to each other and to themselves.
Stated simply, both theories look to the parties' mental processes and how they
viewed the compromise. The difference is that the state of mind theory employs
only a single, subjective criterion-whether each party seems, in the eyes of
the court, to have entered the compromise free of coercion-while the proposed
rule looks to an allocation of risks. To give an example: Where a ship owner
agrees to transport cargo from here to there, the rule allocates to him the risk
46. Professor Fried makes this point. See C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 9-11 (1981), although,
somewhat oddly, he supports the renegotiation of contracts in the face of changed conditions, see id. at 33-
35.
47. See Hillman, supra note 12.
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that the ship will break down, the crew will get sick, and fuel supply will be
too short. For it is the owner of the ship who is best able to predict and control
the sea-worthiness of the ship, the working and living conditions of the crew,
and the fuel supply. Moreover, the rule allocates these risks to the ship owner,
whether he explicitly agreed to these or not, and even if he never had them in
mind. Of course, if he actually had these and other risks in mind at the time
of the contract, the rule would also allocate them to him. But he need not have
thought of and explicitly assumed them, though his having done so will always
be dispositive.4s
The state of mind theory, by contrast, is wholly subjective and does not
address the several, specific risks that may arise; it merely asserts that if the
court believes the compromise was voluntary, it must be upheld.
C. Where Conditions Have Not Changed
The proposed rule applies to compromises made under changed conditions
which motivated an actual or threatened breach. But where a compromise was
entered into after a breach not motivated by any changed conditions, the
compromise is always to be set aside and the original contract upheld. The
reason is that, without a change in conditions, there is no new burden to be
shouldered by a party, and so the original risk allocation is not in danger of
being disturbed. This being so, no risk-preserving function can be served by
a compromise. Indeed the usual function of such "compromises" is simply to
"hold up" the other party and to secure for oneself a more advantageous
outcome than that originally contracted for. Having its contractual partner in
a position of reliance, the party "holds up" its partner, refusing to perform until
additional consideration is put forth.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
The cases in this section fall roughly into four nonexclusive categories, and
it will be seen that the decision rule applies across the range of cases presented:
cases (1) in which the conditions affecting performance have changed, (2) in
which the market conditions have changed, (3) in which compromises do
maintain the original risk allocation, and (4) in which no change in conditions
has occurred.
48. Of course, if such risks are explicitly allocated to the other party, that allocation must be honored.
The point here is that the decision rule applies in the absence of explicit allocations to the contrary.
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A. Cases of Changed Performance Conditions
Two cases in which a breach resulted from changed conditions are Goebel
(citing mild winter, ice company demands higher price from brewer whose beer
will spoil) and Moore (manufacturer refuses to deliver engine until buyer
releases it from liability for delay). Recall that the rule holds that changed
conditions cannot, by themselves, justify a seller's breach. When changed
conditions do occur, then, we must consider how this burden should be allocat-
ed. The rule mandates that the allocation should be consistent with the implicit
or explicit risk allocations at time of contract.
For example, in Goebel, the original contract called for the brewer/buyer
to pay for ice at $1.75 per ton or $2.00 per ton if the ice crop was short. Thus,
it is clear that the risk of warm weather and a short ice crop was explicitly
allocated to the buyer, but only to the extent of $2.00 per ton, after which the
burden of any remaining risk should have been allocated to the seller, who was
the "harvester" of the ice, as it were, and in the best position to recoup any
losses in the following year or years. Under the decision rule, then, the seller
cannot shift the burden amounting to $3.50 per ton to the buyer. Where the
Goebel court assigned to the buyer the risk of a mild winter (by making the
buyer pay $3.50 per ton), the present theory would limit the buyer's risk
allocation to that explicitly given in the contract and would require the buyer
to pay $2.00 per ton. The seller assumes the remaining risk.
With regard to Moore, the present theory allocates the risk of manufacturing
delays (for the locomotive engine) to the manufacturer/seller, since it is in the
best position to predict the time needed for manufacturing, to control the time
expended in production, and to mitigate any delays that do occur, in short, it
is the least cost avoider. Thus, the buyer's claim for damages resulting from
the delay would be entertained and the waiver/compromise, to which the buyer
was compelled to agree before seller would deliver, would be considered void.
Contrast this to the court's result holding the waiver valid.
B. Cases of Changed Market Conditions
The cases of Roth Steel Products and Reynolds are examples in which
market conditions, rather than the conditions under which performance would
be rendered, have changed. In Roth Steel (seller ceases delivery until buyer pays
the new, higher market price) the changed condition-caused by federal price
controls, limited supply, and a favorable export market-was that the seller
could more profitably sell to another buyer, provided his goods were released
from the contractual obligation. Under the decision rule, this changed (market)
condition is conceived of as a risk that, like other risks of changed conditions,
was allocated to the parties at the time of contract: to the seller was allocated
the risk that market prices may go up, to the buyer that they may go down.
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Each party undertakes the risk that later the market may be more advantageous;
yet this risk is assumed in order to take advantage, now, of the benefit of a
stable contract. (Stable contracts, as we have seen, allow nonsimultaneous
exchanges of wealth.) That these assumed and allocated risks occasionally do
obtain, as they did in Roth Steel, is not reason to set aside the contract. Under
the decision rule, then, a market change that results in higher prices will not
excuse a seller's breach; he must perform or pay the buyer expectation damag-
es. The seller in Roth Steel, therefore, would be obligated to sell to the buyer
at the contract price or to put the buyer in as good a position as he expect-
ed.
For Roth Steel, the decision rule confirms the court's holding but not its
reasoning. The Roth Steel court based its holding on the seller's use of coer-
cion, indicating in dicta contrary to the present theory that, had it not been for
seller's use of coercion, the changed market conditions would have justified
the seller's seeking a higher price.
Another case involving changed market conditions is Reynolds v. Nugent.
Here the town paid the Civil War mercenary only $100 (after he performed)
and repudiated its promise to match the higher offer ($350) that had been made
by another town. The court might have reached any of the following outcomes
when, after the town breached its compromise, the mercenary sued:
(1) The town owes the mercenary $100.
(2) The town owes the mercenary $350.
(3) The town owes the mercenary about $250.
The first outcome holds for specific performance under the original contract,
the second upholds the compromise, and the third upholds the compromise with
payment by the soldier of expectation damages to the town, assuming that the
town could have enlisted another mercenary for about $100. (Indeed, these
damages may be greater, amounting to the pay of another mercenary plus
search costs.) Under the doctrines of pre-existing duty and consideration, the
court chose the first outcome. Under the present theory, also, the first outcome
would be chosen. The decision rule indicates that the changed market condition
encountered by the soldier (another buyer willing to pay more) is insufficient
to set aside the soldier's contractual obligation. With the risk of changed
conditions allocated to the parties, it must be the soldier in this case who
assumed the risk that at some later point, as happened here, a preferable con-
tractual partner might be found.49
49. I use the Reynolds case as an example of changed market conditions, and I argue that changed
conditions will not void a contract. I do not address here, however, a possible exception to the rule, that
specific performance may not be required in a personal service contract such as the one in Reynolds.
Moreover, the facts reported in Reynolds are unclear as to whether the agreement was struck at the time
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C. Burden-Preserving Compromises
In requiring a stable allocation of risks, the decision rule assumes not only
that changed conditions cannot defeat a contract but also that a party may not
shift to his contractual partner a burden which was originally allocated to the
party himself. Moreover, a party may not itself cause disadvantageous changed
conditions to descend upon its partner. An example of the potential shifting of
an allocated risk burden occurs in Angel v. Murray (refuse hauler receives
additional payment because of increase in number of housing units).
In Angel, the change in conditions that justified the refuse hauler's increased
payment was roughly a twenty-fold increase in new housing units over the
number on which the contract was predicated. Here the city itself caused the
burden of changed conditions to descend upon the refuse hauler, for the city
controlled the number of housing units that would be built. It is not only that,
at time of contract, the risk of a twenty-fold increase in new housing was
implicitly allocated to the city (which was in the best position to control or
predict this), but also that the city itself caused this risk to materialize. The
decision rule does not bind a party to a contract that has been made more
difficult or costly by the other party or by changed conditions caused by the
other party. Rather, when one party causes changed conditions which will
disadvantage its contractual partner, the party is, in effect, calling for additional
services not bargained for at the time of contract. In such a case, the parties
are free to reach a compromise, as they did in Angel. There is no reason to void
the compromise, then, under the decision rule, for the compromise, which
required the city to pay more, seeks to keep the burden of increased housing
with the city. Under the present theory, then, the compromise would be upheld,
as it was by the court in this case.
Another example of a compromise that seeks to maintain the initial risk
allocation occurs in Stilk v. Myrick. Here the crew of a ship was reduced in size
by two desertions, and the captain promised additional wages to those remain-
ing. The implicit question, since the captain later repudiated this compromise,
is where the burden of potential desertions should be located-in the crew or
in the captain/employer. The answer is that the risk of reduced crew size should
lie with the employer because he is in the best position to control and predict
this possibility. It is the employer who selects the sailors and presumably
exercises judgment in assessing their reliability. (If the crew were, say, union-
ized and hired as a group, then we might argue that the risk of desertion was
allocated to the crew.) Further, the employer is in the best position to provide
incentives for the sailors' continued reliability by making good on promises
regarding food, working conditions, and so on. In Stilk, then, the compromise
of mustering in or earlier. Thus, the proposed rule as I have applied it in Reynolds is meant to be exemplary
and not dispositive in this case.
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agreement of the higher wage should be upheld because it maintains this risk
allocation: the employer bears the burden of reduced crew. This outcome is
contrary to the court's holding in this case.
D. Cases Without Changed Conditions
The prototypical example of repudiated compromise after breach is the so-
called hold-up problem seen in Alaska Packers Association v. Domenico (crew
refuses to complete fishing expedition until employer doubles wage). The
modem parallels are Austin Instrument (seller threatens breach unless desperate
buyer agrees to prices above contract price) and Recker v. Gustafson, where
the sellers of real estate extracted in compromise a second, higher price from
the buyers.
In all three cases the party threatening breach did not claim changed
conditions as a justification for the higher wage or price. And indeed on the
facts reported there were no changed conditions. Thus, the original contract
would be upheld. The rationale, as discussed above, is the necessity of stable
contracts to exchanges that are not simultaneous. Like the courts in Alaska
Packers and Austin Instrument, the present theory calls for upholding the
original contract. Similarly in Recker the contract should be upheld, because
there were no changed conditions affecting the sale of the property. This contra-
dicts the actual outcome at trial but is consistent with the holding on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The repudiated compromise after breach presents courts with cases that
strain traditional contract doctrine because, in contrast to the simple breach of
contract, the parties have made two agreements governing the same transaction,
and each party repudiates one of them. I have argued here that, in resolving
such cases, courts should look to the changed conditions that gave rise to the
breach and compromise and determine with which party the risk of such
changed conditions should lie. Where the breach and compromise appear
unmotivated by or independent of any changed conditions, courts should uphold
the original contract.
The conception of contract that drives the decision rule proposed here
disavows flexibility as a desirable trait of contract law.5" Indeed an explicit
assumption has been that changed conditions will not give rise to a justified
50. This view diverges from at least one alternative proposal for resolving cases of this type, that of
Professor Narasimhan, who stated explicitly that "contracting parties must have some flexibility to adjust
the terms of their relationship to changing conditions." Elsewhere she writes generally of "the parties' need
for flexibility." This assumption puts parties in an uncertain position. The degree to which their contractual
partner is bound is limited by the probability that conditions unfavorable to the partner will arise. Thus,
the certainty with which one may rely on the contract is limited by the foreseeability of changed conditions
which the partner may encounter. See Narasimhan, supra note 12, at 62.
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breach, except that breach with expectation damages may be permitted. The
ideal contract and contract law espoused here, then, is one that stably allocates
risks at the time of the original contract, and this allocation determines the
rights and conduct of the parties should changed conditions arise. Contracts do
not and should not require renegotiation whenever there are changed conditions;
rather, they should continue to govern conduct over a variety of uncertain
futures.

